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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Jurisdiction is con^arred upon this court by §78-2-2(i), 
U.C.A. This appeal is from final judgment of the District 
Court of the Second Judicial District of Weber County, State 
of Utah. The judgment and order to be reviewed on this 
appeal are the Judgment entered May 18, 1988, and the Order 
Denying Defendant's Motion for a New Trial entered August 22, 
1988. The Notice of Appeal was filed September 19, 1988. 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
SHOULD A CALL TO A MONUMENT IN A LEGAL DESCRIPTION TAKE 
PRECEDENCE OVER A DISTANCE CALL. 





STATE OF UTAH 
GEORGE G. MAHAS and 
LUCILLE H. MAHAS, 
Plaintiffs-Respondents, 




STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
This is a suit brought by George G. Mahas and Lucille H. 
Mahas against LaVar Rindlisbacher to determine the correct 
boundary line separating their respective properties which 
are situated in Slaterville, Weber County, State of Utah 
Disposition in the Lower Court 
The matter was heard in trial before the court and the 
court ruled in favor of Mahases. Rindlisbacher filed a 
motion for a new trial. The court denied that motion. 
Statement of Facts 
LaVar Rindlisbacher and Elaine Rindlisbacher, his wife, 
acquired a parcel of real property situated in Slaterville, 
Weber County, Utah, from Priscilla M. Owens, aka Pricilla M. 
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Owens, by warranty deed dated July 10, 1975, and recorded 
July 15, 1975, as entry number 641926, in book 1092, at page 
255 (Exhibit 9). The legal description contained in the 
warranty deed describes the property by metes and bounds and 
calls to a known monument (canal). The legal description is 
as follows: 
A Part of the Northeast Quarter of Section 10, 
Township 6 North, Range 2 West, Salt Lake Meridian, 
U.S. Survey: Beginning 9.06 chains West and South 
27° West 22.43 chains from the Northeast corner of 
Section 10 (at a point in the Northerly line of the 
County Road) thence North 27° East 12.00 chains, 
more or less, to a canal; thence Southeasterly 
along canal to a point North 15° East 10.18 chains 
from the County Road; thence South 15° West 10.18 
chains to the County Road; thence Northwesterly 
along the County Road, 600 feet, more or less, to 
the place of beginning. Excepting therefrom that 
portion Deeded to Marvin L. Barney & wife Edith E. 
Barney in Book 1037, Page 2 and Book 1022, Page 70 
of Records. 
George G. Mahas and Lucille H. Mahas, his wife, acquired 
a parcel of real property situated in Slaterville, Weber 
County, Utah, from Joan Norman, formerly known as Joan Mahas, 
by warranty deed dated July 8, 1985, and recorded July 8, 
1985, as entry number 941574, in book 1474, at page 2513 
(contains the property in dispute as well as additional 
property). The relevant legal description appeared as 
follows: 
A part of the Northeast Quarter of Section 10, 
Township 6 North, Range 2 West, Salt Lake Meridian, 
UoS. Survey: Beginning at a point 8 chains West of 
the Northeast corner of said Section 10; running 
thence West 1.06 chains; thence South 27° West to 
Warren Canal; thence Southeasterly along said canal 
to a point North 15° East 10.18 chains from County 
Road; thence North 15° East 975 feet; thence North 
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74• West 198 feet to the point of beginning. 
This warranty deed was re-recorded on January 21, 1987, 
immediately prior to the commencement of this action, as 
entry number 996627, in book 1507, at page 2758 (Exhibit 7), 
and the relevant legal description therein was altered to 
read as follows: 
A part of the Northeast Quarter of Section 10, 
Township 6 North, Range 2 West, Salt Lake Meridian, 
U.S. Survey: Beginning at a point 8 chains West of 
the Northeast corner of said Section 10; running 
thence West 1.06 chains; thence South 27° West to 
Canal; thence Southeasterly along said canal to a 
point North 15° East 10.18 chains from County Road; 
thence North 15° East 975 feet; thence North 74° 
West 198 feet to the point of beginning. 
The grantor in this warranty deed, Joan Norman, formerly 
known as Joan Mahas, acquired a larger tract of real property 
from which the subject real property was derived, from Earn 
P. Fryer and Ella B. Fryer, by warranty deed dated March 19, 
1970, and recorded April 7, 1970, as entry number 533600, in 
book 938, at page 604 (Exhibit 6). The relevant tract was 
therein described as follows: 
A part of the Northeast quarter of Section 10, 
Township 6 North, Range 2 West, Salt Lake Meridian, 
U.S. Survey, Beginning at a point 8 chains West of 
the Northeast Corner of said Section 10; thence 
West 1.06 chains thence South 27° West to Warren 
Canal; thence Southeasterly along said canal to a 
point North 15° East 10.18 chains from county road; 
thence North 15° East 975 feet; thence North 74° 
West 198 feet to point of beginning. 
Earn P. Fryer and Ella B. Fryer acquired their interest 
in the property from Victor J. Wheeler and Mae Wheeler by 
warranty deed dated May 19, 1942, and recorded May 19, 1942, 
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in book 160, at page 126 (Exhibit 5). The legal description 
of this tract of real property is described as follows: 
A part of the Northeast quarter of Section 10, 
Township 6 North, Range 2 West, Salt Lake Meridian, 
U.S. Surveys Being all that part of the following 
described tract of land which lies North of the 
canal: Beginning at a point 20 chains South and 
10.25 chains West from the Northeast corner of the 
Northeast quarter of said Section 10, running 
thence West 9 chains; thence North 27° East 22.45 
chains; thence East 1.06 chains; thence South 74° 
East 3.85 chains; thence South 7° 45' West 15.84 
chains; thence North 58° West 3 chains; thence 
South 15° West 5 chains to the place of beginning. 
Subsequent to the initiation of this lawsuit, Earn P. 
Fryer and Ella B. Fryer, gave a quit claim deed to George C. 
Mahas and Lucille H. Mahas, this deed being dated May 7, 
1987, and recorded May 7, 1987, as entry number 1010147, in 
book 1516, at page 1121 (Exhibit 8) . The legal description 
was altered to read as follows: 
A part of the Northeast quarter of Section 10, 
Township 6 North, Range 2 West, Salt Lake Meridian, 
U.S. Survey, Beginning at a point 8 chains West of 
the Northeast corner of said Section 10; thence 
West 1.06 chains; thence South 27° West to an old 
canal line; thence Southeasterly along said canal 
to a point North 15° East 10.18 chains from county 
road; thence North 15° East 975 feet; thence North 
74° West 198 feet to a point of beginning. 
Mahases commenced suit against Rindlisbacher under a 
complaint dated February 25, 1987, seeking to establish the 
boundary line between the respective properties and for 
damages for Rindlisbacher's unauthorized use of Mahas1 
property. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The law of boundaries in Utah is settled. It is the 
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purpose of the law to effect the intent of the parties at the 
time of the conveyance. Rules of construction have been 
adopted for the purpose of assisting in ascertaining and 
giving effect to such intent. The primary rule is that fixed 
monuments or markers of a permanent nature which can be 
definitely identified and located take precedence over calls 
of courses and distance, or plats. 
Evidence demonstrates that the relevant deeds contain 
calls to a monument which can be none other than the Warren 
Canal. The court erred in speculating that there might have 
been another canal, and in relying on the county plat which 
erroneously sets forth a speculative representation of a 
canal based upon deed distance calls. The court further 
erred in allowing plaintiff-respondents to claim property 
which was beyond the calls of their title and that of their 
predecessors in title. 
That the judgment of the lower court should be reversed. 
ARGUMENT 
The status of the law of boundaries is well established 
in Utah. 
The most critical consideration in determining 
boundaries is to effect the intent of the parties {see 12 
AmJur 2d, Boundaries, Section 64; Achter vs. Maw, 27 Utah 2d 
149, 493 P2d 989, 993 (1972); Scott vs. Hansen, 18 Utah 2d 
303, 422 P2d 525, 527 (1966)}; and Johnson Real Estate 
Company v. Nielson, 10 Utah 2d 380, 353 P2d 918 (1960). In 
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construing intent the most reliable rule is to accept a call 
to a monument as superior to a distance call. 
The rules of construction for determining the intent of 
the parties are in relevant part set forth as follows: 
1. If all parts of the description can reasonably be 
interpreted to be consistent, the description should be so 
interpreted (12 AmJur 2d, Boundaries, Section 64). 
2. If all parts of the description are not consistent, 
then the order of precedence as between the different calls 
is as follows: 
(a) Natural monuments, (b) artificial monuments, 
(c) adjacent boundaries and finally (d) courses and 
distances. {See 12 AmJur 2d, Boundaries, Section 65; Johnson 
Real Estate Company vs. Nielson 10 Utah 2d 380, 353 P2d 918, 
920 (Utah 1960); Scott vs. Hansen, 18 Utah 2d 303, 422 P2d 
525, 257 (Utah 1966); Achter vs. Maw, 27 Utah 2d 149, 493 P2d 
989, 993 (Utah 1972). 
3. Any call can be disregarded if it leads to an 
absurdity (12 AmJur 2d Boundaries. Sections 66 and 67). 
4. An inconsistent call should be discarded if thereby 
all the rest of the calls are reconciled and the description 
perfected (12 AmJur 2d Boundaries, Section 66). 
5. As few calls or descriptions as possible should be 
disregarded (12 AmJur 2d, Boundaries, Section 66). 
Application of the first rule of construction for 
determining intent requires examination of the deed(s) to 
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determine whether all parts of the description(s) can be 
reasonably interpreted to be consistent. Both the Mahas1 and 
Rindlisbacher's descriptions contain a call to the canal 
followed by the following common course: ... "thence 
Southeasterly along said canal to a point North 15° East 
10.18 chains from county road...11. This requires both 
descriptions to follow the line of the canal to the same 
point. 
Without reference to the monument (physically existing 
canal), neither legal description can trace the line of the 
canal. To attempt to place this course anywhere but on the 
line of the physically existing canal creates an absurdity, 
because there is no legitimate way to bring about closure of 
the description. "Southeasterly" standing alone is too 
vague. On the other hand, reference to the physically 
existing Warren Canal as the existing monument allows the 
property boundary to be precisely defined and allows closure 
of Rindlisbacher's description. The Mahas1 description is 
self contradictory in that it doubles back on itself on part 
of one call, but nevertheless closes. Thus, application of 
this rule of construction allows all parts of both 
descriptions to be interpreted with consistency and therefore 
the Warren Canal should be interpreted to be the boundary. 
Mahases claim that the real intent was to make the 
boundary line an "old canal," not the Warren Canal, and that 
the monument call to "the old canal" is therefore correct. 
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Mahases have laboriously "corrected" their original deeds to 
substitute "canal" for "Warren Canal" in their deed 
descriptions. It is apparent from the original deeds that 
Earn P. Fryer and Ella B. Fryer perceived their boundary to 
be the Warren Canal, and they conveyed title to that 
monument. Likewise, Joan Norman perceived her boundary to be 
the Warren Canal and she conveyed title to that monument. 
Recognizing that a deed call to the Warren Canal was fatal to 
their position, Mahases acquired corrective deeds to change 
the stated intent of Fryers and Norman, and thus obfuscate 
the location of the canal monument. They have attempted to 
create the illusion there was another canal. There is no 
evidence to support the existence of a second canal parallel 
to the Warren Canal. The absence of a second canal is 
evidenced by the following: 
a) Exhibit 23 which demonstrates the existence of 
the Warren Canal as early as 1908, with no reference to a 
parallel canal. 
b) The affidavit in the court file from Wesley T. 
Spencer, a 50 year resident of the area who states that there 
has been but one canal within the area, the Warren Canal, and 
that Rindlisbacher and his predecessors have farmed the 
property to the Warren Canal. 
c) Unopposed proffer of testimony at trial that 
there were witnesses who would testify that there was only 
one canal, the Warren Canal, in the area within the last 
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forty (40) years (p.99). 
d) None of the deed calls recites more than one 
canal. A call to "a canal" or "the canal" implies that there 
was only one canal in the area. In order for the Mahases 
description to reach the line which they claim as the 
boundary requires their description to cross the Warren 
Canal. Reason would argue that if the Warren Canal was in 
existence as early as 1908, and a grantor intended to convey 
property on both sides of the Warren Canal, that the deed 
description would specifically state that the call crosses 
the Warren Canal to another canal, instead of simply reciting 
"to canal." 
Furthermore, to constitute a monument a landmark 
must have certain qualities, such as "visibility, permanence, 
stability and a definite location ..." See Achter vs. Maw, 
Supra at Page 993. Therefore, the "old canal," which exists 
only as a line on the plat map, is still insufficient to 
describe the property, leaving plaintiffs with an invalid 
description. In Scott vs. Hansen, Supra at Page 527 there 
appears the following language: 
"...it becomes important to determine if possible 
the intent of the parties at the time of 
conveyance. There are rules of construction which 
have been adopted for the purpose of assisting in 
ascertaining and giving effect to such intent. One 
of these is that fixed monuments or markers of a 
permanent nature which can be definitely identified 
and located take precedence over calls of courses 
or distances, or plats, or amounts of acreage. 
(Emphasis added.) 
It is submitted that this entire dispute has arisen by 
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virtue of the manner in which the Weber County Recorder has 
designated the Rindlisbacher's and Mahas1 legal descriptions 
on the county plats. (See Exhibit 2). Mahases continue to 
speculate on the possible existence of an old canal to 
justify the validity of their interpretation of their legal 
description because of what is shown on the county plats, 
notwithstanding there is no evidence to support this 
speculation. (See Amended Findings 5 and 6 of the trial 
court.) The plats maintained by the County Recorder are a 
means of identifying property ownership. The plats are a 
two-dimensional representation of ownership and boundaries 
which rely upon the accuracy of surveyors and draftsman, 
without reference to apparent imperfections (such as the 
earthfs curvature resulting in Sections that are sometimes 
larger and sometimes smaller than the ideal norm). Plats are 
further handicapped in accurately describing properties 
because they do not reveal natural or artificial monuments. 
Herein lies the problem with monuments in legal descriptions; 
the law affords priority to monuments in land descriptions, 
while the draftsman who creates the county plats has no way 
of accurately depicting those monuments on his plats, indeed, 
the monuments do not normally appear on the plats. 
Therefore, when he plats a legal description containing 
courses, distances and monuments, he is able to plat only 
those portions which he is able to plat with certainty, 
namely distances. When presented with descriptions such as 
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those of the Mahases and Rindlisbacher, he can plat a course 
with a distance, and then can only speculate as to whether 
the description at that point intersects a monument (canal) 
which does not appear on his plat. Based on his lack of 
certainty, he draws in an imaginary line to represent the 
monument (canal). Others then place reliance upon the 
draftsman's speculation and create other descriptions in 
reliance thereon, resulting in speculation becoming the basis 
in fact for other incorrect legal descriptions. Note that 
all of the testimony in the trial court dealt with a county 
plat which on its face acknowledges that the location of the 
warren canal shown on that plat is an approximation based 
upon an aerial survey. It is not platted therein by a land 
survey. Further note that the deed descriptions of Mahas1 
predecessors in title were for property north of the canal. 
Notwithstanding the Rindlisbacher deed precedes the Mahas1 
deed, and the call of the Mahas1 deed is "south 27° West to 
Warren Canal" or ("an old canal", as re-recorded), the county 
recorder platted the Mahas1 description across the Warren 
Canal to the imaginary line on the plat designated as 
"canal". It is submitted that this was a result of platting 
the Rindlisbacher deed to a distance (12 chains) instead of 
to the monument, and then platting Mahas1 description to this 
point to close and to prevent gaps. 
If, for the sake of argument, Rindlisbacher concedes 
that all parts of his description cannot reasonably be 
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interpreted to be consistent, then an interpretation should 
be sought under the second rule of construction for 
determining intent. If all parts of the description are not 
consistent, then the order of precedence between the calls 
would be first to natural monuments (in this case the canal), 
and lastly to courses and distances, which are the basis for 
Mahas1 attempt to discredit Rindlisbacher1s description. As 
argued elsewhere herein, there is copious evidence that the 
Warren Canal is the only canal ever existing in the area and 
is the monument to which attention must be turned if a 
correct application of the law is to be made in this matter. 
The third rule of construction for determining intent 
allows a call to be disregarded if it leads to an absurdity. 
Rindlisbacher*s call to the canal is consistent with Mahas' 
call to the canal. To follow Rindlisbacher's description 
from the canal southeasterly around the perimeter of his 
description is logical and consistent, and results in 
closure. It is also consistent with the ownership of 
Rindlisbacher's predecessors in title. Likewise, Mahas1 call 
to the canal is consistent with Rindlisbacher's call to the 
canal. To follow Mahas' description southeasterly along the 
canal is consistent with Rindlisbacher's description and is 
also consistent with the ownership of Mahas' predecessors in 
title. The only absurdity in either description occurs when 
Mahas' call retraces itself northward along the canal, 
instead of making a call eastward before proceeding 
12 
northward. This absurdity was created by Mahas1 predecessor 
in title, not by Rindlisbacher. It is erroneous to attempt 
to harmonize Mahas1 description by making the unwarranted 
assumption that another canal may have existed in a location 
justifying that harmony when there is no evidence to support 
If Rindlisbacher1s call to the canal is considered 
inconsistent and thereby discarded, as argued by Mahases in 
application of the fourth rule of construction, Mahases are 
left with their own inconsistent call as stated above, as 
well as the fact that their root of title places their 
description north of the canal. 
Plaintiffs1 Exhibit 1 demonstrates that the chain of 
title, by which Mahases derive title, vested ownership to 
lands lying North of the canal. 
Plaintiffs' Exhibit 5 is a warranty deed dated May 19, 
1942, wherein Victor J. Wheeler and Mae Wheeler convey to 
Earn P. Fryer and Ella B. Fryer, the following: 
A part of the Northeast quarter of Section 10, 
Township 6 North, Range 2 West, Salt Lake Meridian, 
U.S. Survey: being all that part of the following 
described tract of land which lies North of the 
canal: Beginning at a point 20 chains South 10.25 
chains West from the Northeast corner of the 
Northeast quarter of said Section 10, running 
thence West 9 chains; thence North 27° East 22.45 
chains; thence East 1.06 chains; thence South 74° 
East 3.85 chains; thence South 7°45' West 15.84 
chains; thence North 58° West 3 chains; thence 
South 15° West 5 chains to the place of beginning. 
(Emphasis added) 
(Note: This description contains plaintiffs1 
description, together with additional property). 
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Plaintiffs' Exhibit 6 is a warranty deed dated March 19, 
1970, wherein Earn P. Fryer and Ella B. Fryer convey to Jimmy 
G. Mahas and Joan Mahas, the following: 
A part of the Northeast quarter of Section 10, 
Township 6 North, Range 2 West, Salt Lake Meridian, 
U,S. Survey, beginning at a point 8 chains West of 
the Northeast corner of said Section 10; thence 
West 1.06 chains thence South 27° West to Warren 
Canal; thence Southeasterly along said canal to a 
point North 15° East 10.18 chains from County Road; 
thence North 15° East 975 feet; thence North 74° 
West 198 feet to point of beginning, (emphasis 
added•) 
Plaintiffs1 Exhibit 8 is a quit claim deed dated May 7, 
1987 (recorded by Mahas1 counsel subsequent to the filing of 
this lawsuit) wherein Earn P. Fryer and Ella B. Fryer convey 
to George G. Mahas and Lucille H. Mahas, the following: 
A part of the Northeast quarter of Section 10, 
Township 6 North, Range 2 West, Salt Lake Meridian, 
U.S. Survey, beginning at a point 8 chains West of 
the Northeast corner of said Section 10; thence 
West 1.06 chains; thence South 27° West to an old 
canal line; thence Southeasterly along said canal 
to a point North 15° East 10.18 chains from County 
Road; thence North 15° East 975 feet; thence North 
74° West 198 feet to point of beginning, (emphasis 
added•) 
In the body of the above deed appears the following 
language: "This deed is given to correct a deed heretofore 
given by us dated the 19th day of March, 1970 and recorded 
April 7, 1970 in the office of the Weber County Recorder as 
number 533600, which said deed mistakenly referred to the 
"Warren Canal" as one of the boundaries." (It is to be noted 
that this quit claim deed names the Mahases as Grantees, yet 
purports to correct the earlier deed wherein Jimmy G. Mahas 
14 
and Joan Mahas were named as Grantees). 
Plaintiffs1 Exhibit 7 is a warranty deed wherein Joan 
Norman, formerly known as Joan Mahas, conveys to George G. 
Mahas and Lucille H. Mahas the legal description by which 
they now claim title. The warranty deed bears two recording 
stamps. It was first recorded July 8, 1985, at which time 
the relevant legal description read as follows: 
A part of the Northeast quarter of Section 10, 
Township 6 North, Range 2 West, Salt Lake Meridian, 
U.S. Survey: Beginning at a point 8 chains West of 
the Northeast corner of said Section 10; running 
thence West 1.06 chains; thence South 27° West to 
Warren Canal thence Southeasterly along said canal 
to a point 15° East 10.18 chains from County Road; 
thence North 15° East 975 feet; thence North 74° 
West 198 feet to the point of beginning. (Emphasis 
added)• 
This warranty deed was subsequently re-recorded January 
21, 1987, at which time the relevant legal description was 
modified to read as follows: 
A part of the Northeast quarter of Section 10, 
Township 6 North, Range 2 West, Salt Lake Meridian, 
U.S. Survey: Beginning at a point 8 chains West of 
the Northeast corner of said Section 10; running 
thence West 1.06 chains; thence South 27° West to 
Canal; thence Southeasterly along said Canal to a 
point 15° 10.18 chains from County Road; thence 
North 15° East 975 feet; thence North 74° West 198 
feet to the point of beginning. (Emphasis added). 
It is clear from an examination of plaintiffs1 Exhibit 1 
(including the Warranty Deed from Russell C. Wheeler and 
Maude E. Wheeler to Victor J. Wheeler) and plaintiffs1 
Exhibit 6 that Mahas1 predecessor in title acquired only that 
property North of the canal. It is suggested that had there 
been more than one canal in the area the parties would have 
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so specified. In reality there was but one canal, the Warren 
Canal. Therefore, regardless of the status of defendant 
Rindlisbacher's legal description, Mahas' predecessors cannot 
convey to Mahases an interest in property South of the canal. 
To do so, Mahas' predecessor in interest would be conveying 
something they did not have. 
CONCLUSION 
The most critical consideration in determining 
boundaries is to effect the intent of the parties. The rules 
of construction for determining the intent of the parties 
provides a logical sequence within which a description can be 
analyzed. 
First, if all parts of the description can be reasonably 
interpreted to be consistent, the description should be so 
interpreted. It has been demonstrated that there is no 
inconsistency. 
Second, if portions of the descriptions are 
inconsistent, then the order of precedence between the calls 
is first to monuments and "last to courses and distances. For 
clarification of Mahas' and Rindlisbacher's descriptions, 
this necessitates resort to the physically existing monument 
(canal). 
Third, a call may be disregarded if it leads to an 
absurdity. The only call leading to an absurdity is a call 
in the Mahas' description which doubles back upon itself. 
Fourth, an inconsistent call should be disregarded if 
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thereby all the rest of the calls are reconciled and the 
description perfected. To disregard the physically existing 
monument for courses and distances and an artificial monument 
created on a plat is clearly contrary to law. Furthermore, 
it does not allow for the perfection of all of the 
descriptions in that it expands plaintiffs ownership across a 
physical monument inconsistent with the ability of 
plaintiffs1 predecessors in title to convey. 
The judgment entered by the lower court is inconsistent 
with a correct application of the law, and that judgment 
should be reversed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
BACKMAN, CLARK & MARSH 
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J U D G M E N T 
Civil No.98505 
The above entitled matter having come on regularly 
for hearing on the 23rd day of February, 1988, and plaintiff 
appearing and being represented by their attorney, I. GORDON 
HUGGINS, and the defendant appearing and represented by his 
counsel, MARTIN V. GRAVIS. Plaintiff and his witnesses 
having been duly sworn and testifying and the defendant 
having called his witness and testified and based upon the 
testimony and exhibits submitted by the parties, and the 
Court having entered its Findings of Fact and Conclusions 
of law, now enters its Order: 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED That 
plaintiff is the owner of certain real property located in 
Slaterville, Weber County, Utah and more particularly 
described as follows, to wit: 
A part of the Northeast Quarter of Section 10 T6N, 
R2W, SLM, U.S. Survey: Beginning at a point 8 
chains West of the Northeast corner of said Section 
10; running thence West 1.06 chains; thence South 
27° West to Canal; thence Southeasterly along said 
canal to a point North 15° East 10.18 chains from 
County Road; thence North 15° East 975 feet; thence 
North 74° West 198 feet to the point of beginning, 
free and clear of any claim of defendant. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the 
Warren Canal is not the canal referred to in Plaintiff and 
Defendant's property descriptions and that the property 
lines are those designated by courses and distances without 
reference to any monument now in existence relating to the 
South line of Plaintiff's property and the North line of 
Defendants property. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that 
plaintiff's complaint against defendant for damages be 
dismissed with prejudice. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that 
plaintiff shall be awarded his court costs incurred in this 
matter. 
DATED This '} day of )^i>^>^ , 1988 
/<:/ A •/ S £ , /C* // 
DAVID E. ROTH 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
I. GORDON HUGGINS,1569 
Attorney at Law 
1218 First Security Bank Bldg. 
Og&en, \3tah, ft 4 401 
Telephone: 392-7587 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF WEBER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
GEORGE G. MAHAS AND ) AMENDED 
LUCILLE H. MAHAS 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
Plaintiff ) CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
vs ) 
LAVAR RINDLISBACHER 
) Civil No.98505 
Defendant ) 
The above entitled matter having come on regularly 
for hearing on the 23rd day of February, 1988, and plaintiff 
appearing and being represented by their attorney, I. GORDON 
HUGGINS, and the defendant appearing and represented by his 
counsel, MARTIN V. GRAVIS. Plaintiff and his witnesses 
having been duly sworn and testifying and the defendant 
having called his witness who testified and based upon the 
testimony and exhibits submitted by the parties, Now 
therefore, the Court hereby makes its: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. That the plaintiff is the owner of certain real 
property located in Slaterville, Weber County, Utah and more 
particularly described as follows, to wit: 
A part of the Northeast Quarter of Section 10 T6N, 
R2W, SLM, U.S. Survey: Beginning at a point 8 
chains West of the Northeast corner of said Section 
10; running thence West 1.06 chains; thence South 
27° West to Canal; thence Southeasterly along said 
canal to a point North 15° East 10.18 chains from 
County Road; thence North 15° East 975 feet; thence 
North 74° West 198 feet to the point of beginning. 
2. That the defendant is the owner of certain real 
property adjacent to Plaintiff's property, more particularly 
described as follows, to wit: 
A Part of the Northeast Quarter of Section 10, 
T6N, R2W, SLM. U.S. Survey: Beginning 9.06 chains 
West and South 27° West 22.43 chains from the 
Northeast corner of Section 10 (at a point in the 
Northerly line of the County road); thence North 
27° East 12.00 chains, more or less, to a canal; 
Thence Southeasterly along canal to a point North 
15° East 10.18 chains from the County road; thence 
South 15° West 10.18 chains to the County Road; 
Thence Northwesterly along the County Road, 600 
feet, more or less, to the place of beginning. 
Excepting therefrom that portion deeded to Marvin L. 
Barney and Wife, Edith E. Barney in Book 1037, page 
2 and Book 1022 page 70 of Records 
3. That conveyances from Plaintiff's and 
Defendant's predecessors in title describe said properties 
by courses and distances which, when surveyed and platted, 
close and harmonize. 
4. That if the Warren Canal is the Canal that is 
referred to in most of the Deeds, then the descriptions of 
Plaintiff's and Defendant's parcels doesn't make any sense. 
5. From the evidence admitted, it appears that the 
Warren Canal has not moved significantly since 1908. 
6. That there is no strong evidence, in recent 
history, that there is another canal in the area in 
existence, but there is, in fact, a reference to a canal 
that is described in the metes and bounds description in 
that location, some evidence of a possibility that at one 
time there was a canal in that area. 
7. That if this was the case where the canal was 
some 50 feet or less off the metes and bounds description, 
it would be assumed that that the canal was the boundary. 
But, where it is some 400 feet off, to find that the Warren 
Canal is the boundary would lead us to an absurd result. 
8. That there are clear descriptions of all parcels 
in that area where Plaintiff's and defendant's properties 
are located and they all seem to suggest that the natural 
boundary is where Plaintiff is arguing it is. It is so 
found that that is the boundary. 
9. That if the metes and bounds description of 
Plaintifffs property is charted with the acreage computed 
therefrom, the acreage is approximately 4 1/2 acres. If the 
Warren Canal were the boundary, with the acreage computed, 
there would be less than 2 acres. This would result in an 
absurdity. Therefore, Plaintiff prevails on his claim as to 
where the boundary is. 
10. That there is insufficient evidence to 
determine damages claimed by plaintiff for defendant's use 
of the property or otherwise. 
From the foregoing Findings of Fact, the Court 
enters its: 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. Plaintiff is entitled to a Judgment against 
defendant determining that the true property line between 
the properties of the parties be located by the Courses and 
distances calls only of their respective conveyances. 
2. That the Warren Canal is not the monument 
referred to in the conveyances of Plaintiff and Defendant, 
3. That defendant is entitled to an Order 
dismissing Plaintifffs Complaint against defendant for 
damages to plaintiff!s property. 
4. That Plaintiff is entitled to his costs of 
Court. 
DATED This // day of Vr^ cT^y^\
 f i988. 
/si O^ t / / X £ / c f ^ 
DAVID E. ROTH 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
APPROVED AS TO FORM 
MARTIN V. GRAVIS 
Attorney for Defendant 
I. GORDON HUGGINS,1569 
Attorney at Law 
1218 First Security Bank Bldg. 
Ogden, Utah, 84401 
Telephone: 392-7587 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF WEBER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
GEORGE G. MAHAS AND ) 
LUCILLE H. MAHAS ORDER ON DEFENDANT'S MOTION 
Plaintiff ) FOR A NEW TRIAL and 
LAVAR RINDLISBACHER PLAINTIFFS MOTION FOR 
ATTORNEY FEES 
) Civil No.98505 
Defendant ) 
The above entitled matter having come on regularly 
for hearing on the 15th day of August, 1988, plaintiff 
represented by their counsel, I. GORDON HUGGINS and 
defendant represented by his counsel, GARY A. SARGENT. 
Arguments were made to the Court and based upon the 
arguments of counsel and notations made at the time of the 
trial, the Court makes the following findings: 
1. A great reliance was placed upon the testimony 
of the three expert witnesses testifying at the time of 
trial, all of whom testified that the properties of both 
plaintiff and defendant would not close if the Warren Canal 
were used as a reference point to determine the boundary of 
the parties properties. In their opinion the Warran Canal 
was not the canal referred to in the Deeds to Plaintiffs1 
and Defendants1 properties, and the court so finds.. 
2. That the difference of 400 feet in the distance 
between the Warren Canal and the metes and bounds 
description is to great a difference to ignore. The Warren 
Canal cannot be used as the call in determining the boundary 
lines of plaintiffs1 and defendants1 properties, 
3. That the decision heretofore made in the above 
entitled matter was correct and is reaffirmed. 
4. That plaintiffs Motion for Attorney fees is not 
appropriate in this matter, and that defendant's Motion for 
a New Trial should be denied. 
WHEREFORE, the court makes the following order: 
1. That defendant's Motion for New Trial is 
denied. 
2. That plaintiff's Motion for Attorney Fees is 
denied. 
3. That the decision heretofore made in the above 
entitled matter is hereby reaffirmed in its entirety. 
DATED this 1P^ day of August, 1988. 
DA-VIE >A ID E. ROTH 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
APPROVED AS TO FORM 
GARY A/SARGEN 
